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Abstract 
Most philosophers of science do philosophy ‘on’ science. By contrast, others do philosophy 
‘in’ science (‘PinS’), i.e., they use philosophical tools to address scientific problems and to 
provide scientifically useful proposals. Here, we consider the evidence in favour of a trend of 
this nature. We proceed in two stages. First, we identify relevant authors and articles empirically 
with bibliometric tools, given that PinS would be likely to infiltrate science and thus to be 
published in scientific journals (‘intervention’), cited in scientific journals (‘visibility’) and 
sometimes recognized as a scientific result by scientists (‘contribution’). We show that many 
central figures in philosophy of science have been involved in PinS, and that some philosophers 
have even ‘specialized’ in this practice. Second, we propose a conceptual definition of PinS as 
a process involving three conditions (raising a scientific problem, using philosophical tools to 
address it, and making a scientific proposal), and we ask whether the articles identified at the 
first stage fulfil all these conditions. We show that PinS is a distinctive, quantitatively 
substantial trend within philosophy of science, demonstrating the existence of a methodological 
continuity from science to philosophy of science. 
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Most philosophers of science do philosophy “on” science, i.e., they contribute to our knowledge 
of the methods, concepts, objects, and problems of science, and/or address philosophical 
problems using lessons taken from science (Malaterre et al. [2019], [2020]). By contrast, some 
philosophers of science do philosophy “in” science, that is, use philosophical tools to produce 
scientific knowledge rather than knowledge about science (Chang [1999]). Instead of studying, 
discussing or talking about science, they permeate through science and try to participate in 
resolving problems that scientists raise or encounter in their work — problems that most other 
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philosophers of science consider local and technical. We propose calling this trend in 
philosophy of science, in which philosophers use philosophical tools to address scientific 
problems and provide scientifically useful proposals, ‘philosophy in science’ (‘PinS’). 
The idea that philosophers of science can directly contribute to scientific knowledge 
will be met with surprise or skepticism by some, scientists (Weinberg [1992]; Hawking [2010]) 
and philosophers (Curd and Cover [1998], p. xvii) alike, even philosophers who have permeated 
through science (Okasha [2019], pp. 5–6). This reaction is based on the intuition that only a few 
philosophers of science intend to produce science, and that even fewer succeed in doing so, or 
on the assumption that philosophy of science simply cannot produce science. But what if 
‘philosophy in science’ – in this strong sense of addressing scientific problems, not just having 
an impact on science – had a significant number of instances and a rich history? The finding 
that there is, indeed, a community of philosophers ‘in’ science, would have a major impact on 
several issues that have been central to philosophy of science throughout its history (e.g., 
(Suppes [1990]; Callebaut [1993]; Chang [1999]; Hull [2001]; Pernu [2008]; Laplane et al. 
[2019]; De Haro [2020])): are philosophy of science and science continuous? Is philosophy of 
science useful to science? Does a philosophy that permeates science ipso facto cease to be 
philosophy?  
Several names and approaches immediately come to mind when we think about 
philosophers of science meddling with science, but they usually either have two distinct 
activities (one in science, another in philosophy), or claim closeness to science to treat 
philosophical, not scientific problems. Patrick Suppes is a perfect example of a philosopher of 
science who has also made scientific contributions (e.g. Suppes et al. [1997]). One may wonder 
whether all of his scientific papers have a strong philosophical content. At least in some cases, 
philosophers of science permeating through science may not do so qua philosophers, but as a 
parallel activity, especially if they have a double background in science and philosophy. 
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Various approaches, such as philosophy of science in practice and experimental philosophy, 
have promoted a convergence of science and philosophy. Philosophy of science in practice ‘is 
dedicated to fostering the pursuit of a philosophy of science that considers theory, practice and 
the world simultaneously, and never in isolation from each other’ (Ankeny et al. [2011]). Most 
philosophy of science in practice is philosophy ‘on’ science.2 Experimental philosophy is 
characterized by the use of ‘experimental methods traditionally associated with psychology and 
cognitive science’ (Knobe and Nichols [2017]). Most experimental philosophy treats 
philosophical problems with experimental methods, rather than scientific problems with 
philosophical tools. The meaning of PinS is not, therefore, immediately captured by these sister 
trends in philosophy of science.  
It does not seem appropriate to rely on intuitions or preconceived ideas alone to 
determine which people or articles belong to PinS, because there is a high risk of disputes 
focusing purely on the meaning of ‘producing scientific knowledge with philosophical tools’, 
given certain conceptions of ‘philosophy’ and ‘science’. Instead, we need an empirical and 
philosophically unbiased method to detect a corpus of likely PinS authors and papers, which 
we can use to characterize more precisely the nature of PinS. We reasoned that philosophers 
aiming to address scientific problems and to provide scientifically useful proposals would 
attempt to establish a dialog with scientists, and that even minimal success in this endeavour 
would probably have led to their work being published, cited or explicitly mentioned as 
contributive by scientists in scientific journals (“intervention”, “visibility” and “contribution”, 
respectively, collectively constituting “permeation”). We propose the use of bibliometric tools 
and qualitative analysis of citation to identify our corpus of interest on the basis of these three 
measurable criteria. We do not use bibliometrics for evaluative or sociological purposes, to 
 
2 E.g., “philosophers do not necessarily collaborate with scientists, but use empirical methods drawn from the 
historical or social sciences (such as archival research, ethnographies or interviews) to acquire insights into and 
evidence of scientists’ research behavior” (Boumans and Leonelli [2013]). 
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learn something about an already well-identified object: philosophy of science (Wray [2010]; 
Wray and Bornmann [2015]; Weingart [2015]; McLevey et al. [2018]; Pence and Ramsey 
[2018]; Malaterre et al. [2019]; Plaisance et al. [2019]; Khelfaoui et al. [2021]). Instead, we use 
bibliometrics for investigating philosophically the unique achievements in a subset of 
philosophy of science. This bibliometric method is as imperfect as any other detection strategy 
for the definition of this field, so we consider it essential to combine it with a second, 
philosophical stage. As discussed below, it is possible, but extremely unlikely, that our 
detection method generates false negatives: papers raising a scientific problem and offering a 
scientific proposal that have never attracted the interest of scientists and have never been cited, 
even once, by scientists. By contrast, our method seems to generate a large number of false 
positives, that is, papers published in scientific journals, and/or cited in scientific journals, 
and/or considered to constitute significant scientific contributions that do not meet the definition 
of PinS as the use of philosophical tools to produce scientific knowledge. For this reason, the 
second stage of our analysis consists of a sort of ‘reflective equilibrium:’ we use the a priori 
definition above to filter out the papers of the corpus identified by bibliometrics that do not 
really correspond to PinS. Conversely, we obtain a much more precise characterization of PinS 
by analysing the content of many papers that have succeeded in raising scientific problems and 
using philosophical tools to propose a solution to these problems. 
In other words, we adopt a two-stage method. The first stage is detection (we use 
bibliometrics to identify a corpus a posteriori), and the second stage is definition (we apply 
qualitative, a priori, criteria to select some genuinely PinS papers among those identified in the 
first stage, and we arrive at a much more precise description of PinS). We define ‘permeating 
through science’ as the traceable presence, via bibliometrics, of philosophers in scientific 
journals, and ‘participating in science’ as the production of scientific knowledge. Permeation is 
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not a necessary condition for participation; rather, it is the best external criterion for detecting 
the presence of PinS in an immense set of texts. 
This paper demonstrates that PinS is a distinctive, significant trend within philosophy 
of science. Our argumentation is structured as follows. In section 2, we present intervention, 
visibility, and contribution as three ways for philosophers to permeate through science. Sections 
3 to 5, corresponding to the detection stage, examine these elements in detail. Sections 6 to 8 
goes beyond the limitations of our detection method and provide a philosophical analysis of 
features specific to PinS. In the conclusion, we discuss the status of PinS as a well-identified 
community of philosophers, texts, and methods, and draw the consequences of the existence of 
PinS on interactions between philosophy and science.  
This paper should be of interest to all philosophers of science reflecting on dialog with 
the sciences. Even if some readers object to the bibliometric analysis, we hope to show that it 
is instrumental for our demonstration. All the technical bibliometric discussions appear in the 
Appendices; experts in bibliometrics will find online[link] a note with the full description of 
our methodology. 
 
2. Key Concepts for the Detection of a ‘Philosophy in Science’ (Pins) Corpus: 
Intervention, Visibility and Contribution 
‘Permeating through science’ may mean different things to different philosophers of science: 
participating at science conferences, discussing a scientific point with scientists, joining a 
scientific society, or publishing papers in scientific journals. The last of these activities would 
undoubtedly be seen by scientists as the most significant. As sociologists of science have 
shown, publishing papers in peer-reviewed journals is at the heart of scientific activity and 
constitutes the principal route to becoming a member of the scientific community and gaining 
scientific recognition (Hagstrom [1965]). Moreover, philosophers of science intending to use 
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philosophical tools to produce scientific knowledge are likely to try to establish a dialog with 
scientists by publishing in scientific journals. We define intervention as the act of publishing a 
paper in a scientific journal. 
We define visibility as the citation, in a scientific paper, of a paper written by a 
philosopher of science. It is, of course, possible for philosophers to be visible in science without 
actually publishing in scientific journals or being cited by scientists. Plato, Kant and 
Schopenhauer were once visible in physics, and Popper and Kuhn are visible in fields in which 
they have not published. However, this ‘visibility’ is often nonspecific, and difficult to measure 
at the level of a whole scientific community. We overcome this problem here by using 
quantitative citation analysis. We define visibility operationally as the level of citation of the 
works of philosophers of science in scientific journals, for the papers they have published in 
both science and philosophy of science journals. It seems likely that philosophers using 
philosophical tools to produce scientific knowledge will be cited at least once in a scientific 
journal if they are at least minimally successful.   
An analysis of citation contexts showed that, across all domains, many of the citations 
are ‘perfunctory’ rather than ‘substantial’: they do not explicitly draw on the content of the cited 
paper, and are therefore rather ‘hollow’ (Moravcsik and Murugesan [1975]). It may be that the 
citations of philosophy of science papers by scientists are generally of this type, and perhaps a 
sceptic will think that they are all of this type. We therefore used a third notion, contribution, 
to measure the magnitude of the impact of a given philosophy of science paper within science. 
We define contribution as the explicit and substantial recognition, by scientists, that a 
philosophical work advances science. Unlike the first two notions, which are quantitative, 
contribution is a qualitative notion based on an analysis of citation context. Contribution is a 
subset of visibility, because a paper that is never cited in scientific journals cannot be considered 
a scientific contribution. The ‘contribution’ criterion is the most demanding, as few papers 
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written by philosophers are likely to be explicitly acknowledged by scientists as significant 
scientific contributions. So, this criterion is likely to exclude many genuine PinS papers (that 
is, to generate ‘false negatives’). However, its consideration is crucial, because it constitutes 
the highest level of achievement for philosophers of science intending to permeate through 
science, and would constitute a major objection to the existence of PinS if no scientific citations 
to papers written by philosophers of science were ‘substantial’ rather than ‘perfunctory’. 
Both philosophers and their papers can qualify as ‘interventionist’, ‘visible’ or 
‘contributive.’ Intervention is binary, while visibility and contribution come in degrees. 
As shown in Figure 1, a visible philosophical paper is not necessarily an intervention. 
Papers published in philosophy of science journals rather than in scientific journals (i.e., “non-
interventionist” papers) can be cited in scientific journals. A philosophical contribution to 
science is not necessarily interventionist either, as non-interventionist papers can contribute to 
science.  
 
Fig. 1. Definition and intersection of three different ways in which philosophers of science can infiltrate 
science. 
 
Below, we provide a more detailed description of intervention, visibility and 





Is there a distinctive group of philosophers of science who permeate through science? A first, 
albeit imperfect, sign would be that such a group would be likely to publish in science journals.  
 We identified philosophers of science as individuals who had published at least two 
papers in 17 journals specializing in philosophy of science, between 1977 and 2017. Crucially, 
to prevent biases, we excluded all non-peer-reviewed items and philosophy of science articles 
written by professional scientists. A detailed description of our methodology, including an 
explanation of why we adopted an extensive definition of ‘professional scientists’ to avoid 
overestimating PinS, is provided in Appendix#1. 
We first considered the 100 most cited philosophers of science in philosophy of science 
journals between 1977 and 2018.3 We investigated how many of these philosophers had 
published peer-reviewed articles in scientific journals: 78 had done so at least once, 58 at least 
twice, 29 at least five times, and 22 had never done so. On average, these 100 philosophers had 
published 4.25 papers in scientific journals, and 14.5 papers in philosophy of science. The 
highly interventionist philosophers identified in this list included Butterfield and Redei (17 
papers in each published in scientific journals), Redhead and Glymour (14 each), Schurz (12), 
Sober, Godfrey-Smith, and Moreno (11 each). However, what matters here (as in our other 
bibliometric analysis), is not individuals concerned, but the general trend. A significant 
minority of these 100 philosophers have frequently published in scientific journals. 
Nevertheless, the ratio of papers published by these philosophers in scientific journals relative 
to philosophy of science journals (0.29 on average) clearly indicates that the intellectual 
 
3 These philosophers are the most cited in our list of 17 journals for their papers published in the same list of 17 
journals. Our timeframe for cited references is 1977-2017, while our timeframe for citing references is 1977-2018. 
This one-year difference allows us to count citations to the papers published in 2017.  
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activities of these central figures of philosophy of science remain firmly focused on their own 
field.  
We then identified highly interventionist philosophers of science, defined as those who 
had published at least five papers in scientific journals between 1977 and 2017. We identified 
101 such philosophers of science. The majority (71) of these highly interventionist philosophers 
were not among the 100 most highly cited philosophers of science described above. On average, 
these philosophers had published 11.5 papers in scientific journals and 10.2 in philosophy of 
science journals. Strikingly, 56 had published at least as many papers in science journals as in 
philosophy of science journals. Extreme examples include Barry Smith (26 times as many 
papers in scientific journals as in philosophy journals) and Jerome Wakefield (12.5 times as 
many papers in scientific journals). The mean ratio in this group of 101 philosophers was 1.75, 
contrasting with the value reported above (0.29), and suggesting that there is, indeed, a subset 
of philosophers of science for whom publishing in scientific journals is a major aim, to which 
a large fraction of their research time is devoted.  
Thus, being part of a scientific community by intervening in science is an important 
output for a large and distinctive set of philosophers of science, most of whom are not highly 
cited in philosophy of science journals. This suggests that most philosophers of science are not 
cited in scientific journals because they are also cited in philosophy of science journals, but that 
they are cited for a separate, scientifically oriented, activity.  
 
4. Visibility 
One sign that a distinct group of philosophers of science participate in solving scientific 
problems is the citation of their articles by scientists. Citation alone is not enough, but 
philosophers who are not cited by scientists are unlikely to participate in a meaningful way to 
science.  
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We performed a citation analysis, to determine the extent to which different groups of 
philosophers are cited in science, firstly for their articles in philosophy of science journals, and 
then for their articles in scientific journals. The absolute number of citations is not an 
appropriate measurement, because citation practices vary considerably between domains, 
rendering inter-domain comparisons meaningless. Instead, we focused on two proportions. We 
first considered the proportion of citations in scientific and philosophy of science journals 
obtained by philosophers of science for their articles published in philosophy of science. We 
then compared the mean number of citations obtained by philosophers for their articles 
published in journals of a given scientific discipline, relative to the mean number of citations in 
that discipline in general. This made it possible to determine whether philosophers of science 
intervening in a given scientific domain were cited more or less frequently than typical scientists 
from the domain concerned.  
How frequently are papers published in philosophy of science journals cited in scientific 
journals? We distinguished four categories of philosophers of science (Table 1):  
- Highly interventionist in science and highly cited in philosophy of science. 
- Highly interventionist in science but not highly cited in philosophy of science.  
- Not very interventionist but highly cited in philosophy of science.  
- Neither very interventionist in science nor highly cited in philosophy of science.  
By construction, this fourth category groups together the vast majority of philosophers of 
science (several thousand). Therefore, the descriptions ‘not very interventionist in science’ and 
‘not highly cited in philosophy of science’ should not be interpreted too literally: many 
philosophers of science in this category have published in scientific journals and/or are cited in 
philosophy of science journals, but not enough to be considered among the most interventionist 
or the most visible. Tracking the citations of all philosophers in this category would require 
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manual curation of thousands of articles potentially written by homonyms. We therefore 
randomly selected 200 philosophers from the 1,000 most cited philosophers of this category.  
 
Author category Number of philosophers 





of citations in 
scientific journals 
Highly interventionist 
in science and highly 
cited in philosophy of 
science 




in science and not 
highly cited in 
philosophy of science 
73  36.5 
 
27.6 
Not very interventionist 
but highly cited in 
philosophy of science 





science nor highly cited 
in philosophy of science 








Table 1. Mean percentage of citations of philosophy of science papers in scientific and philosophy of 
scientific journals, by author category4 
 
Table 1 shows that, on average, articles in philosophy of science journals: 
- Get a higher proportion of citations in scientific journals when their authors are highly 
interventionist (24.6%) (combining lines 1 and 2) rather than not highly interventionist (14.6%); 
- Are not proportionally more cited in science when their authors are highly cited in philosophy 
of science (18%) (combining lines 1 and 3) rather than not highly cited in philosophy of science 
(21.25%).  
- Are more cited in scientific journals when their authors are highly interventionist but not 
highly cited in philosophy of science (27.6%) rather than highly interventionist and highly cited 
in philosophy of science (21.7%).  
 
4 The sum is less than 100%, because these papers are also cited in the social sciences and humanities (including 
general philosophy). 
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 This suggests the existence of a group, among philosophers of science publishing in 
canonical journals, for which publishing in scientific journals is an active choice, rewarding in 
terms of number of citations in science, independently of their number of citations in philosophy 
of science.    
We then assessed the visibility philosophers obtain for their articles published in 
scientific journals, relative to that of scientists. We used the field/year-normalized average ratio 
of citations (ARC).5 An ARC in science of 1.00 means that a philosopher’s papers published in 
a given scientific domain and a given year receive the same number of citations as the average 
for scientists active in the domain concerned, for papers published in the same year; values of 
1.25 or 0.75 means that they receive 25% more or less citations, respectively, than the average 
scientist in the same domain.  
Table 2 shows that, unsurprisingly, articles published in scientific journals by 
philosophers generally result in less visibility for the philosophers than for scientists in the 
scientific field concerned. Visibility was higher for philosophers who intervened frequently. 
The visibility of philosophers who intervened frequently but were not highly cited in philosophy 





authors   
 
Mean ARC in science 
Highly interventionist in 
science and highly cited in 




Highly interventionist in 
science and not highly cited 





Not very interventionist and 






Neither very interventionist 
in science nor highly cited in 






5 The ARC makes it possible to make inter-domain comparisons; so, it is not useful to give an ARC for citations 
within philosophy of science exclusively. 
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Table 2. Mean ARC for papers published in scientific journals by philosophers of science from four 
categories 
 
Together, the results shown in Tables 1 and 2 support the hypothesis that highly 
interventionist philosophers of science have a hybrid philosopher-scientist profile. Their ARC 
in science is two thirds what it would be if they were scientists, whether or not they are 
frequently cited in philosophy of science journals. 
We will now turn our attention away from the philosophers, to their articles. We focused 
on 229 of the most visible papers (defined by an ARC in scientific journals ≥ 1.0 and an absolute 
number of citations in scientific journals ≥ 20) published by philosophers of science in scientific 
journals. The mean ARC in scientific journals for these 229 papers was 2.19, indicated that, on 
average, these papers obtained more than twice the number of citations obtained by scientific 
papers in the same scientific domain published the same year. Appendix#2 gives the 38 papers 
(of the 229) with an ARC in scientific journals of 3 or more. A handful of these papers even 
had an ARC ≥ 10 (Fine [1982]; Oreskes et al. [1994]; Laland et al. [2015]). (These papers 
should be considered extreme examples, not typical of the visibility of philosophers in science). 
Half of the highly visible articles in scientific journals are authored by highly 
interventionist philosophers not highly cited in philosophy of science, confirming the 
hypothesis that they constitute a distinctive group of philosophers.6 Highly interventionist 
philosophers of science not only form a specific subgroup within philosophy of science, but 
 
6 Physics is the discipline in which philosophers have intervened the most, with the lowest impact (338 papers; 
ARC in science 0.41). Biology is the discipline in which they have intervened most efficiently (253 papers; ARC 
in science 0.84). The other disciplines in which they have mostly intervened are computer sciences (ARC=0.49), 
mathematics (ARC=0.70), and medicine (ARC=0.81). Philosophy of mind, psychology and cognitive science, and 
philosophy of the social sciences have been mostly omitted from our results; they deserve special treatment and 
require a different bibliometric approach. Many authors in these domains are interventionist and visible, typically, 
Dennett (Dennett [1978]; McKay and Dennett [2009]) and Fodor (Fodor [1983]; Fodor and Pylyshyn [1988]); on 
this, see (Thagard [2009]). Some papers in philosophy of the social sciences have been published in social science 
journals and have been visible; an example is the work of Dietrich and List (e.g., [2007]), providing detailed proof 
that, contrary to the received view, Arrowian preference aggregation is a special case of judgment aggregation, 
rather than the converse. We have used a dozen examples from these fields to check that the rest of our 
argumentation is consistent with most of these works, at least for those published in scientific journals. 
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their level of visibility in the scientific discipline in which they intervene suggests that they are 
also part of the corresponding scientific community. Philosophers of science who both 
intervene in science and are visible in scientific journals seem to bridge the gap between 
philosophy of science and science, with training in philosophy but a more significant 
publication activity in science than in philosophy. As this activity is mostly invisible in 
philosophy of science journals, it is vastly underestimated, although it may prove to be a highly 
significant part of philosophy of science. 
A crucial question is now to determine whether scientists who cite these philosophical 
papers published in science, consider at least some of them to be contributive to science itself.  
 
5. Contribution 
A paper written by a philosopher may be visible without bringing something really new to a 
scientific domain. A third criterion for detecting science permeation is the paper being a 
scientific contribution, that is, being acknowledged by scientists as a significant advancement 
of their field. As opposed to the previous quantitative bibliometric criteria, what we call 
‘contribution’ here is classically assessed through qualitative citation analysis, exploring papers 
on a one-by-one basis with a particular attention to the scientific context of the paper 
(Moravcsik and Murugesan [1975]) (criteria in Appendix#3).  
In science, most citations are known to be perfunctory. There is no reason to think that 
PinS is different. Conversely, some citations in science are substantive and reveal a genuine 
contribution to a scientific field. The questions are 1) whether this can happen with PinS papers, 
2) whether the level of contribution can be significant and 3) what the nature of the contribution 
is. Of course, a paper may constitute a genuine scientific achievement without being recognized 
as such by the scientific community. Conversely, it is likely to exclude genuine scientific 
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achievements simply because they have not been recognized as such. Nevertheless, it provides 
the best evidence that certain papers by philosophers have really contributed to science. 
 As a result of an inquiry, we have established a preliminary list of papers by 
philosophers that were likely to be contributive, then checked that they were according to 
specific criteria (length, accuracy, non-redundancy, etc.), and finally retained only the most 
significant (level of contribution) (Appendix #3). 
Contribution is a very exacting criterion. Sceptics might think that papers written by 
philosophers are never contributions in this sense. Yet some papers written by philosophers 
provide an indisputable scientific contribution, as demonstrated by the following major 
examples. These examples illustrate three main ways in which philosophers of science have 
made scientific contributions: by producing novel scientific results (including theorems and 
observations), novel scientific tools, or by participating in a scientific debate.  
Some philosophers produce novel scientific results. This is rare but compelling. For 
example, Malament ([1977]), by generalizing a result due to (Hawking et al. [1976]), 
formulated a theorem, widely used in quantum gravity, especially in the causal set theory 
approach (Surya [2019]). This theorem, often referred to as the ‘Hawking-King-McCarthy-
Malament theorem’ (Bombelli and Meyer [1989]; García-Parrado and Senovilla [2005]; Surya 
[2019]), states that the causal structure determines the topology, differential structure, and 
conformal geometry of a future and past distinguishing causal space-time. This explains why 
Malament, whose work was driven by philosophical considerations about the connections 
between time and causality, is regularly cited together with Hawking, and is specifically 
recognized as having made an important contribution to physics. Some physicists, especially 
the more experimentally oriented, do not see theorems as typical products of physics. Yet, there 
is no doubt that theorems are a typical scientific product in theoretical physics, accounting for 
the appearance of Malament’s work in widely used theoretical physics textbooks (e.g., (Isham 
 17 
[1989])) and in recent reviews of quantum gravity by leading physicists (Oriti [2009]). Another 
important example is provided by the work of Shimony in quantum mechanics. Replying to 
Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, Bell showed, in 1965, the disagreement between quantum 
mechanics and local realistic theories. Building on the crucial work of Clauser and colleagues 
([1969]), Clauser and Shimony ([1978]) showed that Bell’s results could be extended to actual 
systems and discussed the experiments that they and others proposed for testing this hypothesis. 
They concluded that either the realism held by most working scientists should be abandoned, 
or that a drastic revision of our space-time concept was required. 
Other philosophers have made observations or performed experiments, another 
prototypic scientific product. Such philosophers have contributed to the establishment of facts, 
something generally unexpected from philosophers. Wakefield (Wakefield et al. [2007]) 
provides an interesting example. Wakefield showed in a retrospective epidemiological study 
that uncomplicated grief and complicated grief present with the same symptoms, but that the 
former reaction gives a lower score than the latter on all measurement scales. They concluded 
that the ‘bereavement exclusion’, according to which all bereaved individuals should be 
excluded from a diagnosis of major depression, should not be abandoned, but rather extended 
to any form of significant loss. The results were accepted by the community, but the conclusion 
drawn has been a matter of debate among prominent psychiatrists, some siding with Wakefield 
(Belmaker and Agam [2008]), and others opposing him (Kendler et al. [2008]). Wakefield’s 
view did not prevail, but his contribution is visible in the current definition of major depressive 
disorder (American Psychiatric Association [2013], p. 5). 
A second category is the production of fruitful scientific tools. Not all the tools proposed 
by philosophers can be considered scientific contributions, only those that are successful, that 
is, adopted by scientists and used to generate novel scientific results. Two sets of tools are 
examined here: methodologies and conceptual tools. Philosophers can propose new scientific 
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methodologies, or improve existing methodologies. An important example here is Barry 
Smith’s role in the development of biomedical ontologies. For example, one of his major goals 
was to explicate the broad ontological category of ‘relation’ (Smith et al. [2005]). Various 
ontologies use relational terms (‘is_a’, ‘part_of’, etc.), without explicit, compatible or even 
consistent definitions. The paper proposed distinguishing relations between classes, between 
instances, and between a class and an instance on the one hand; and distinguishing between 
‘continuants’ and ‘processes’ on the other. A list of relations followed, designed to be both 
sufficiently intuitive and maximally compatible with existing ontologies. The clearest 
confirmation of the scientific importance of this proposition is its integration into the OBO 
Foundry project, and its use in practice (Mungall and Emmert [2007]; Courtot et al. [2011]; 
Carbon et al. [2019]). The ChEBI ontology has amended its “ambiguous and incorrect usage of 
the relationships ‘is a’ and ‘is part of’” (de Matos et al. [2010]) in light of Smith’s work (Smith 
et al. [2005]). 
In addition to methodologies, philosophers can provide conceptual tools. It would be 
absurd to consider all of the almost infinite instances of conceptual analysis proposed by 
philosophers of science as scientific contributions. However, whenever a new conceptual 
framework proposed by philosophers is used by scientists to generate novel scientific results, it 
should be considered a scientific contribution. Many examples exist across the subdomains of 
philosophy of science. One particularly productive area is philosophy of evolutionary biology, 
as highlighted by many biologists (e.g., (Orzack [2012])). Two examples are provided by the 
contributions of David Hull and Elliott Sober. Integrated into the biological community to the 
point of being elected President of the Society for Systematic Biology, Hull saw his work as 
continuous with science (Callebaut [1993], pp. 201; 215; Hull [2001]). For instance, he 
proposed clarifying the debate over “units of selection” by adopting a novel and empirically 
neutral vocabulary: ‘replicators’ and ‘interactors’ (Hull [1980]). This distinction (differing 
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from Dawkins’ distinction between ‘replicators’ and ‘vehicles’ (Hull [1994])) was instrumental 
in revealing that the scientific debate over units of selection had, in part, been a pseudo-debate, 
in which scientists frequently used words to mean different things. The utility of this distinction 
is attested by many supportive comments from biologists. For example, Gould and Lloyd 
([1999]) stressed that ‘Hull’s important distinction between replicators and interactors helped 
to clarify conceptual and empirical issues at the center of debates about units of selection.’ 
Szathmáry and Maynard Smith ([1997]) explicitly used Hull’s definitions to develop their own 
classification of different types of replicators.  
Another important example of conceptual clarification is Sober’s work with evolutionist 
David S. Wilson. Together (Wilson and Sober [1989]), they proposed a re-examination of the 
long-standing debate in evolutionary biology about the possibility of natural selection acting at 
the level of groups and ‘superorganisms.’ They proposed that ‘superorganisms,’ defined as 
collections of single creatures in which between-unit selection overwhelms within-unit 
selection, are not only logically possible, but really exist in nature. This proposal has been 
widely used and discussed in the scientific literature, particularly by biologists interested in 
testing whether this definition of a superorganism works for particular species (e.g., (Ratnieks 
and Reeve [1992])). In another study, Szathmáry and Maynard Smith ([1995]) used their 
framework directly to make a novel scientific contribution, extensively citing Wilson and 
Sober’s criteria for superorganismality and applying them to a different issue, namely 
explaining the origins of a novel cohesive group in evolution. 
The third category is participation in a scientific debate, which does not generate 
immediate scientific results, either directly or indirectly, but is nonetheless recognized as useful 
by scientists. Patricia Churchland’s ‘neurophilosophy’ defends a neurobiological approach to 
questions relating to cognition. Neurophilosophy did not launch this now dominant approach 
in contemporary neuroscience, but it participated to it by eliminating philosophical obstacles, 
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such as the belief that ‘the brain does not think’. Her methodological articles were published in 
prestigious journals (Churchland and Sejnowski [1988]), and major neuroscientists have 
thanked Churchland for preliminary discussions on some of their papers (Craig [2009]).     
 A radical take on the contribution of philosophers to science involves the use of a 
counterfactual approach, asking: Would this scientific field have been different without this 
contribution? Obviously, only a few contributions have radically changed the scientific field, 
but this is also true for most papers published by scientists. ‘Game-changers’ are rare in science, 
but some of the examples of papers written by philosophers examined above would probably 
qualify (e.g., Malament). 
We are perfectly aware that defining and assessing ‘scientific contribution’ is difficult 
and partly subjective (Appendix#3), and that not all philosophical works cited by scientists can 
be considered as scientific contributions. The aim of this section was to demonstrate that, 
despite such obstacles, there are examples of philosophical work that unequivocally qualify as 
scientific contributions. Importantly, it also sketches what kind of results of a philosophical 
analysis scientists may accept as a contribution. 
 
6. Detection Vs. Definition of Pins Papers 
As stated in the introduction, our aim is to identify and characterize PinS, understood as the 
activity by which philosophers of science address a scientific problem and use philosophical 
tools to make a scientifically useful proposal. The investigation above (sections 2 to 5) is a 
preliminary detection, constituting only the first stage towards this identification. It offers an 
empirical approximation of the extension of the set of possible PinS authors and papers, 
focusing on the work of philosophers of science who publish in scientific journals, are cited in 
scientific journals, or make scientific contributions (known as ‘permeating through science’). 
However, this method can miss papers that raise a scientific problem and use philosophical 
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tools to make a scientifically useful proposal, but are not published in scientific journals, cited 
in such journals or considered contributive (false negatives), and it can include papers that are 
published and/or cited in scientific journals and/or are considered contributive but that do not 
actually address a scientific problem and use philosophical tools to make a scientifically useful 
proposal (false positives). 
Our method is highly unlikely to generate many false negatives, because if a paper 
attempts to establish a dialog with science, its failure to meet at least one of our conditions for 
permeation (published in scientific journals, cited in scientific journals, considered a 
contribution) would be a clear sign that it missed its target. Such ‘PinS sleeping beauties’ may 
exist but, again, it seems unlikely.  
 By contrast, false positives are a major challenge. There is no reason to assume that all 
the papers permeating through science address a scientific problem and use philosophical tools 
to make a scientifically useful proposal. In particular, there is no reason to assume that they 
have a strong philosophical content: perhaps the papers published by philosophers of science 
in scientific journals, cited in scientific journals, and/or considered contributive are so close to 
science that their philosophical dimension is weak, or even non-existent. 
 A second stage of analysis, centred on a philosophical rather than bibliometric approach, 
is therefore necessary to establish which papers and authors constitute PinS. The following 
three elements are essential for inclusion in PinS: addressing a scientific problem, using 
philosophical tools, and making a scientific proposal. We now use these elements as criteria 
and apply them to some of the papers identified in sections 2-5, to identify genuine instances 
of PinS. 
 Section 7 establishes a PinS corpus composed of a significant number of papers that 
both permeate through science (that is, meet at least one of the criteria of intervention, visibility 
and contribution) and include the three elements of PinS. Section 8 shows that it is these three 
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elements that render PinS unique within the domain of philosophy of science. We conclude that 
PinS does indeed exist as a distinctive and important, albeit largely invisible to date, trend in 
philosophy of science. 
 
7. The Three Elements Essential to Pins 
The present section describes the three elements essential to a PinS paper based on a sample of 
significant examples, then provides quantitative evidence that there are many more than these 
examples.  
 
7.1. First element: Addressing a scientific problem 
PinS papers address a scientific problem, that is, a problem that scientists of a given field 
themselves can address with their usual methods. Not many philosophers address scientific 
problems. Intuitively, it might be thought that philosophers cannot address such problems, but 
this is exactly what the practice of PinS contradicts. Column 2 of Table 3 shows a list of 
problems addressed by PinS papers, across different domains. 
 
ARTICLE SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM MAIN PHILOSOPHICAL 
TOOL 
SCIENTIFIC PROPOSAL 
(Clarke et al. 
[2014]) 
Is evidence of a mechanism 
between treatment and 
better outcome a low form 
of evidence?  
Questioning a claim. 
Questions the received method 
advocated by Evidence-Based 
Medicine on the ground of 
views on evidence of causality 
Method. Specific methodological 
guidelines are proposed to assess 
evidence of the effectiveness of a 





Following Bell’s theorem, 
should we say that either 
the thesis of realism or that 
of locality must be 
abandoned? 
Questioning consistency. 
Checks the consistency between 
realism and different theoretical 
and experimental approaches 
inspired by Bell’s theorem  
Extends previous work about Bell’s 
theorem, and proposes new 
experiments to test it 
(Craver et al. 
[2014]) 
Is risk aversion in decision-
making a consequence of 
anticipated regret? 
Combination of scientific 
domains. Combines a debate in 
decision theory and economics 
with neurosciences to make the 
claim testable 
Experiment. A test on a person 
with hippocampal lesions incapable 
of anticipating regret shows that 
this person takes risk-aversive 
decisions, thereby challenging the 
view that risk aversion is a 
consequence of anticipated regret 
(Feferman 
[1984]) 
Are usual solutions to some 
semantic and mathematical 
paradoxes (like the liar’s 
paradox), including 
hierarchies of levels and 
Proposing a distinction. 
Distinguishes between useful 
type-free theories and merely 
logical solution by a thorough, 
comparative analysis of 
Demonstration. A demonstration 
that type-free, but useful, theories 
are possible 
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theories of types, overly 
constraining? 





Can locality be reconciled 
with realism in quantum 
mechanics? 
Proposing a definition. 
Defines and distinguishes two 
commonly confused types of 
contextuality, ontological and 
environmental 
Proposes a novel demonstration: 
any local realism leads to a 
Kochen-Specker type of 
contradiction, which connects the 
results of Kochen-Specker to those 
of Bell  
(Laland et al. 
[2011]) 
Should two types of causes 
(proximal and ultimate) be 
distinguished in biology? 
Questioning a claim. Based on 
recent work on evo-devo, niche 
construction and other domains, 
questions Mayr’s distinction 
between proximal and ultimate 
causes 
Method. Biologists must consider 
the influence of developmental 
aspects on evolutionary processes, 
and more generally be open to 
processes of reciprocal causation 
(Mayo and 
Spanos [2006]) 
Where should probability 
enter in inductive inference 
in science? 
Rooting a scientific problem 
in a context. An analysis of the 
historical and philosophical 
context of traditional statistical 
tools reveals 3 approaches to 
the significance test: 
behavioristic, inferential and 
degrees of belief 
A fourth approach to the 
significance test is proposed, 
according to which it is interpreted 
by the concept of the degree of 





Are claims of validity and 
verity of numerical models 
in the earth sciences 
legitimate? 
Proposing definitions. A 
conceptual analysis of 
‘validation’ and ‘verification’ 
Method. The justification of 
models should not be understood in 
terms of validation or verification, 
but only in terms of degrees of 
confirmation and relative to 




How should the causal 
efficacy of medical 
treatments be assessed? 
Proposing a distinction. 
Reveals a discrepancy between 
the notion of a “cause” used by 
most biomedical scientists and 
the notion of a “cause” used by 
epidemiologists 
Proposes a unified concept of 
‘clinical causation’ that helps 
interpret correctly the actual 
information provided by a 
randomized trial as an 
approximation to causal effects at 




How to model dynamic 
social interactions (i.e., 
social interactions that 
change over time via 
reinforcement, punishment, 
etc.)? 
Proposing a combination. 
Combines different scientific 
domains, namely the social 
sciences, philosophy, 
evolutionary biology, and 
mathematics 




Can group selection exist, 
and can natural selection act 
at the level of 
superorganisms? 
Questioning consistency. 
Shows an inconsistency in the 
dominant idea that the organism 
can be a unit of selection, 
whereas the group cannot 
Provides a precise and testable 
hypothesis about selection 
occurring at the level of 
superorganisms, illustrated by 
examples and the suggestion of a 
novel experiment (to test 
community-level selection in the 
laboratory) 
 
Table 3: An analytical list of paradigmatic examples of PinS papers. These papers include the three key 
elements of the process. For each paper, column 2 describes the specific question addressed, column 3 the main 
tool type, and column 4, the specific scientific proposal and its type (in bold typeface). 
 
 Certain permeating papers, despite their publication and/or citation in scientific journals, 
do not address a scientific problem. Some use science to shed light on a traditional philosophical 
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problem, e.g., self (Churchland [2002]) or morality (Churchland [2008]). Others raise 
paradigmatic problems of general philosophy of science, similar to those traditionally found in 
philosophy of science journals (e.g., about models, theories, or explanations), albeit in a manner 
attractive to scientists. For instance, some papers published in scientific journals, even by 
notoriously interventionist philosophers of science, raise general questions about science (Hull 
[1996]). By contrast, Churchland and Winkielman ([2012]), for example, investigated whether 
oxytocin modulates social cognition, and Hull ([1980]) investigated the scientific question of 
units of selection. 
 
7.2. Second element: Using philosophical tools 
The second key element of PinS is the use of philosophical tools to address the scientific 
problem in an original manner.  Without philosophy, there can be no PinS. Obviously, not all 
papers published and/or cited in scientific journals have a strong philosophical content. We 
have already mentioned Suppes’ parallel activities. Philosopher-scientist Brett Calcott’s 
participation in the work of Lanfear et al. (Lanfear et al. [2012]) is purely scientific (personal 
communication), whereas many of his other contributions, concerning the relationship between 
biology and engineering (Calcott et al. [2015]), for example, are as philosophical as they are 
scientific.  
We propose that papers should be considered to include this second element if, and only if, 
they use some of the traditional tools of philosophy (conceptual analysis, attention to the ‘big 
picture,’ metaphysical distinctions, etc.), using them to address a scientific problem.  
Our investigation reveals that a significant number of permeating papers achieve just that. 
In other words, PinS papers do not cease to be philosophical because they are also scientific. 
This investigation also inductively reveals the types of philosophical tools crucial for PinS. 
They include:  
 25 
-  Investigating and/or proposing a scientific definition or distinction.  
- Rooting a scientific problem in its broadest philosophical or historical context.  
- Questioning the consistency of a set of claims made in a scientific field. 
- Questioning methods on the grounds of broader views on methodological concepts.  
- Questioning a scientific claim.  
- Proposing a combination of scientific domains. 
This should be considered as a working hypothesis based on the confrontation of the list 
provided by Laplane et al. [2019] to many more examples. These tools are not intended to 
define philosophy of science, but only to detect its presence. The list is non-exhaustive, as other 
tools may be added to the list; moreover, it is not entirely specific to philosophy of science, as 
scientists may also resort to them, albeit less frequently and less thoroughly. Column 3 of Table 
3 lists selected examples of successful uses of these philosophical tools in PinS articles. The 
philosophical dimension is not highly visible in all PinS papers, but the key point is that it is 
never entirely absent. 
 
7.3. Third element: Making a scientific proposal 
The third key element of PinS is making a scientific proposal to solve at least a part of the 
scientific problem identified in element 1, and necessarily via the philosophical tools used in 
element 2. If, in addition, a scientific proposal from philosophers of science happens to be 
accepted as useful by scientists, then it becomes a ‘contribution’ (as defined above), but this is 
not a necessary condition for achieving element 3. This element concerns the making of a 
scientific proposal, not the recognition of this proposal, by scientists, as a significant 
contribution.  
 Many permeating papers do not include this third element, even if they include the first 
two elements. There are numerous examples in philosophy of statistics of illuminating concepts 
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that are simply not developed to the point of being immediately operational, although they could 
be rendered operational in principle (e.g., Cartwright’s notion of ‘stable capacity’ (Cartwright 
and Munro [2010])). 
 However, a significant number of permeating papers do include this element (Column 
4 of Table 3). They propose new ideas to scientists under the guise of new theories, concepts, 
observations, and so on, which scientists can discuss, test, endorse, or reject. For example, 
Clifton et al. ([2003]) played a key role in the development of an information-based approach 
to quantum theory, whereas other philosophers, as we have seen, suggested new demonstrations 
(Fine [1982]) or new theorems (Malament [1977]). It is very rare for philosophers to propose 
new experiments, but even that is not entirely unheard of. For example, Shimony participated 
in the formulation of novel experimental programs for testing Bell’s theorem (Clauser et al. 
[1969]; Clauser and Shimony [1978]). A handful of philosophers have been involved directly 
in novel experimental work (Lenski et al. [2003]; Gazave et al. [2013]; Craver et al. [2014])). 
Appendix#4 provides other examples of papers making scientific proposals. 
 Establishing that a significant number of papers include these three elements, is 
necessary to justify the existence of a PinS ‘trend’ within philosophy of science. The inquiry 
described in Appendix #4 resulted in 177 PinS articles. To be sure, there are many more, 
including among non-interventionist and less visible papers, but these numbers are sufficient to 
establish the existence of a significant trend. 
 
8. How Does PinS Differ from the Rest of Philosophy of Science? 
It is not straightforward to determine what makes PinS distinctive within philosophy of science. 
Treating a question that matters to scientists with philosophical tools and hoping for the result 
to have an impact is, after all, quite common.  
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First, most papers in philosophy of science do not raise a scientific problem, that is, a 
problem that scientists can address with the methods usually used in their field. For example, 
most papers about explanation, causality, or modelling raise problems that are too general to be 
considered by scientists as problems that must be addressed scientifically, such as can theories 
be reduced to ‘families of models’ in line with the semantic view (Morrison [2007])? By 
contrast, PinS begins with a deliberate restriction to questions that can be addressed 
scientifically. Much of contemporary philosophy of science is scientifically informed and, in 
the case of philosophy of the special sciences, can be highly specialized, but being scientifically 
informed is not the same as addressing a scientific problem. 
 General philosophy of science uses traditional philosophical tools as much as PinS does. 
However, whereas, in philosophy of science, the philosophical treatment of a question is 
naturally developed in its own right (that is, articulated with alternative philosophical proposals, 
fully explicit, and sometimes even an object of discussion itself), PinS papers are often less 
connected to philosophical tradition, and more focused on the applicability of the proposed 
solution.  
Finally, philosophy of science papers do not generally develop a scientific proposal, and 
if there is one, it generally remains implicit and potential.7 Consider the example of theories. 
Most papers on theories do not propose a new model or theory. Instead, they discuss theories 
suggested by others, which is undeniably useful but does not constitute a scientific proposal, 
strictly speaking. Historically inclined papers about past theories are archetypal here (Norton 
[1993]), but discussions of present-day competing theory interpretations (Popper [1967]) or 
theoretical frameworks (e.g., (Rubin [2018])) are similar. Many of these papers raise a scientific 
problem and use philosophical tools, but they do not include the third element, because they do 
 
7 There are, of course, exceptions. For example, the work of Huw Price on time irreversibility and retrocausality, 
though published in philosophy of science journals and books ((Price [1997], [2012])), provides a novel 
understanding of the concept of time, and this proposal has been discussed by leading physicists, e.g., (Rovelli 
[2016]). 
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not push their discussion far enough for it to become a scientific proposal. By contrast, it is 
essential to PinS that the solution to a problem is sufficiently developed and explicit. 
 We have shown above that PinS is clearly different from the rest of philosophy of 
science. A majority of philosophy of science papers illustrate what we called ‘philosophy on 
science’, that is, their aim is to contribute to our knowledge of the methods, concepts, objects, 
and problems of science, and/or to address philosophical problems using lessons taken from 
science. This aim is essential and legitimate, but it clearly differs from the aim of PinS (Figure 
2). An interesting case here is philosophy of science in practice (PSP), a major emerging trend 
in recent philosophy of science, which it is interesting to compare with PinS. John Dupré 
distinguished between ‘philosophy of science-in-practice’ and ‘philosophy-of-science in 
practice.’ Most of PSP is philosophy on science. An example is provided by the work of 
Leonelli and Ankeny ([2012], [2015]) on the emergence of scientific communities around 
model organisms and databases. How these communities emerge and what constitutes them is 
typically not a question that these communities try to address in their scientific work, although 
it is a major philosophical question that cannot be raised fruitfully without excellent scientific 
competence. On the contrary, ‘philosophy-of-science in practice’ is characterized by 
‘philosophy directly engaged with scientific research through interaction with scientists about 
philosophical problems’ (Boumans and Leonelli [2013]). A good example of ‘philosophy-of-
science in practice’ is provided by (O’Malley and Dupré [2005]), because this paper constituted 
an intervention in the then emerging field of systems biology and proposed useful avenues for 
further research. One way to define PinS would be to say that it is a subset of ‘philosophy-of-




Fig. 2. While philosophy on science does not contribute to solve a scientific problem, philosophy in science 
does. 
 
Once PinS has been defined and established as a trend in philosophy in science, further 
features of interest will emerge. Based on our detailed analysis of this corpus, we provide three. 
First, in PinS papers, philosophers see scientists, rather than philosophers of science, as their 
most direct ‘peers’ (i.e., the people to whom they talk and who will judge the value of their 
work). This is demonstrated by the fact that, in almost all the examples analysed, more than 
75% of the cited references related to scientific articles rather than to philosophy articles. 
Similarly, many PinS papers discuss and/or criticize in depth one precise scientific claim (a 
theory, an empirical hypothesis, an approach, etc.) In addition, 66% of PinS papers are co-
authored by philosophers and scientists. Some PinS papers connect the scientific problem to a 
central question of the philosophical tradition, e.g., realism/antirealism or the definition of 
individuality, and many PinS papers use general philosophy of science but very few remain at 
that level, suggesting overall that, to generate scientific results, it is indispensable to dive into 
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a specific scientific field. Second, the main philosophical tool in PinS papers seems to be 
conceptual analysis in the empirical sciences, but not in more formalized sciences, such as logic, 
statistics, or some domains of philosophy of physics or philosophy of social science. Third, 
most proposals by philosophers are conceptual tools or participations in scientific debates. 
Some are methodological proposals. Very few are scientific results. Most articles with an 
extensive scientific content (experiments, typically) have a short philosophical development, 
and vice versa.  
 
9. Conclusion 
A crucial and long-standing question for philosophers of science (Callebaut [1993]; Chang 
[1999]; Hull [2001]; Laplane et al. [2019]; De Haro [2020]; Khelfaoui et al. [2021]) and some 
scientists (Weinberg [1992]; Pigliucci [2008]; Hawking [2010]; Orzack [2012]; Rovelli [2018]) 
is how philosophy of science relates to science, including, in particular, its possible impact on 
science. Various important ways in which philosophy of science can have an impact on science 
have been documented in the past, from the influence of Mach, Poincaré and Schopenhauer on 
the development of the theory of relativity (Rovelli [2018]) to Popper’s long-recognized 
influence on scientists, such as Eccles and Medawar8, and some recent reflections on how best 
to organize science institutionally (e.g. Leonelli [2017]). Here, we identify and describe an 
approach that we propose to call ‘PinS’, which adds another, in our view essential, layer to this 
picture.  
By combining quantitative and qualitative tools, we demonstrate the existence of a 
corpus of articles by philosophers of science, either published in philosophy of science journals 
or in scientific journals, raising scientific problems and aiming to contribute to their resolution 
via the use of philosophical tools. PinS constitutes a subdomain of philosophy of science, which 
 
8 For a critical examination of Popper’s influence on scientists, see (Mulkay and Gilbert [1981]). 
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has a long history, with canonical texts and authors, but, to our knowledge, this is the first time 
this domain is delineated and analysed. 
Now that the main features of PinS have been analysed, a promising avenue for future 
research will be to use further bibliometric or text mining tools (e.g., (Pence and Ramsey 
[2018]; Malaterre et al. [2019])) to reach a finer characterization of PinS. Importantly, 
successful text mining requires a rigorous ontology, based on the kind of qualitative analysis 
provided here. 
The description we propose here is closer to the view that philosophy and science belong 
to a continuum than to the view that they are different activities. Like most of the defenders of 
the view of a philosophy-science continuum (Frank [1957]; Suppes [1979], [1990]; Callebaut 
[1993]; Chang [1999]; Hull [2001]) and most of those who have recognized that philosophers 
of science sometimes participate in science (Suppes [1954], [1990]; Chang [1999], [2011]), we 
consider that there are clusters of activities that are typical of what philosophers do and others 
typical of what scientists do (Laplane et al. [2019]). For various reasons, from training 
background to peers’ expectations and time investment, experimental design, and model 
building, for example, seem to be typical practices of scientists only sometimes used by 
philosophers, whereas conceptual analysis, and cross-domain comparisons, for example, are 
typical practices of philosophers only sometimes used by scientists.9  
Do philosophers in science constitute a ‘community’ within philosophy of science? 
Assuming that this would require a sense of belonging grounded in shared problems, methods, 
classic texts, and institutional markers, such as journals, societies, and conferences (Hagstrom 
[1965]), our analysis suggests that there is not yet a PinS community. PinS is thematically 
scattered, to almost the same extent as the scientific domains in which it intervenes. This 
 
9 Many scientists, including very influential ones, use some tools of the philosophical toolbox described above 
(e.g., Mayr and Lewontin in biology, Rovelli in physics). What matters for our argument is that the majority of 
scientists do not use such tools in most of their daily research activities. 
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probably explains why PinS has remained largely invisible at the level of the philosophy of 
science community as a whole. By making PinS more visible and describing its common 
features, this paper may contribute to the emergence of a self-conscious community of 
philosophers ‘in’ science. 
This group clearly contains scientists, especially those who are philosophically inclined 
and have collaborated with philosophers, as illustrated by many of the examples discussed in 
this paper, and as explained in Appendix#1. The reason for which scientists were excluded 
from our analysis of the ‘permeation’ of science (Sections 2-5) is a pragmatic one, as their 
inclusion would have led to an overestimation of the number of papers published and cited in 
scientific journals. 
 Finally, the existence of PinS demonstrates that philosophy of science plays a role in the 
construction of our knowledge of the world. Philosophers of science can use philosophical tools 
to contribute to the specific knowledge of a given part of the world, that is, to the construction 
of a local scientific image (Van Fraassen [1980]; Guay and Pradeu [2020]). When engaged in 
PinS, philosophers of science contribute to the special ontology of a given science (asking, for 
example, ‘should we admit superorganisms to our ontology of the living world?’). Distinctively, 
philosophers in science do not content themselves with putting together the local images of the 
world built by scientists, but instead participate in the building of those images. This activity 
and others confirm the main conclusion of this paper, that some philosophers of science not 






Appendix#1: Basic bibliometric definitions used in this paper 
To measure the number of publications by and citations to philosophers of science, we used the 
Web of Science (WoS) reference database (more specifically, the WoS Core collection), for the 
period 1977-2017. Queries were made through a SQL relational database hosted by the 
Observatoire des sciences et des technologies (OST), generally updated once a year by data 
from Clarivate Analytics. Excel tables were generated according to specific queries. We cannot 
make the micro data public because the OST is bound by a legal contract with Clarivate 
Analytics forbidding such distribution from the WoS. Of note, WoS is not a perfect reflection 
of scientific production, but for our purposes, it is safe to assume that it is representative. 
 
- Paper types 
We excluded all non-peer-reviewed items, such as editorials, comments, replies, letters to the 
editor, book reviews, obituaries, vulgarization, and educational documents, so as not to 
overestimate the intervention, visibility, and contribution of philosophers.  
 
- Definition of ‘philosopher of science publishing in science journals’ 
The WoS does not categorize authors according to their specialty. It is not, therefore, 
straightforward to generate a list of philosophers who have published in scientific journals. We 
first generated a list of 32,468 articles by 1,569 unique authors with at least two publications in 
philosophy of science journals and two in scientific journals. We then manually excluded: 1) 
scientists who have published in philosophy of science journals, 2) homonyms (i.e., scientists 
with the same names as philosophers).  
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We stipulated that two conditions had to be jointly met for an author to be a philosopher of 
science in the bibliometric sense: 
- An author of at least two papers on our list of papers published in 17 journals 
specializing in philosophy of science.  
- A person holding a PhD in the domain of philosophy and/or working in a philosophy 
department. 
The second condition was used to avoid overestimating PinS’s weight. For example, Rob 
Knight, an eminent biologist, has published four papers in philosophy of science journals, and 
18 of his scientific papers have been cited more than 1,000 times. Including him and other 
scientists with a similar profile (Mayr, Lewontin, Kendler, Rovelli, etc.) would have led to an 
overestimation of the impact of philosophy of science on science. We therefore excluded all the 
papers such scientists published in science journals or philosophy of science journals, except 
when they were co-authored with philosophers of science in the above sense. 
The downside is that many such scientists have published significant philosophical 
contributions in philosophy of science or in science journals (e.g., (Mayr [1969]; Good [1983]), 
and that many philosophers in science are both philosophers and scientists. These individuals 
include people with two successive careers in science and philosophy (e.g., Alfred Tauber, 
Massimo Pigliucci), and people who have two simultaneous careers in these two domains (e.g., 
Brett Calcott, Dennis Dieks, Peter Gärdenfors, Eva Jablonka, Sahotra Sarkar). Here again, we 
applied a stringent rule: for those who, in addition to a scientific career, hold a PhD in 
philosophy and/or work in a philosophy department, we kept their papers published in science 
journals only if that had an explicit philosophical content (e.g., (Clauser and Shimony [1978])). 
 
- List of journals in philosophy of science 
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The WoS has a ‘History and Philosophy of Science’ category for classifying journals, but it 
was not suitable for direct use here, as WoS categories are non-exclusive: a given paper can 
appear, for instance, as both an HPS paper and a philosophy paper. We overcame this problem, 
by constructing a list of 17 philosophy of science journals (Table 4). 
 
 
Philosophy of science journal name Time period covered 
BIOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY  1988-2017 
BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 1956-2017 
ERKENNTNIS 2000-2017 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 2011-2017 
FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE 2008-2017 
HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE LIFE SCIENCES 1988-2017 
HYLE 2005-2017 
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 2010-2017 
JOURNAL FOR GENERAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 2008-2017 
JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY 1976-2017 
MEDICINE HEALTH CARE AND PHILOSOPHY 2008-2017 
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 1956-2017 
STUDIES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 1974-2017 
STUDIES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF MODERN PHYSICS 1998-2017 




THEORETICAL MEDICINE AND BIOETHICS 1998-2017 
 




Arguably, philosophy of science articles are also published in more generalist 
philosophy journals, such as The Journal of Philosophy, and, most importantly, in philosophy 
books and edited books. Citations from books are not included in the WoS database and are, 
thus, not considered in our analysis. However, the list of 17 journals includes the most central 
journals in philosophy of science, making it possible to define a community representative of 
the field (Khelfaoui et al. [2021]). It is very unlikely that a philosopher of science who has 
published a visible monograph or paper in a general philosophy journal between 1977 and 2017 
would not also have published in a philosophy of science journal. Finally, it has been shown 
that the ranking of the most cited philosophers obtained in a database of book citations, the 
Book citation Index, is strongly correlated with the ranking obtained using the WoS (Gingras 
and Khelfaoui [2019]). 
Another potential objection to our list is that it includes contributions in domains other 
than philosophy of science, such as ethics and the history of science. As a means of addressing 
this problem and avoiding overestimation, we manually removed all articles in ethics or history 
of science that did not have a strong philosophy of science dimension. 
 An important practical limitation to our work was that ‘Studies C’, a central journal in 
philosophy of biology and philosophy of medicine, is not included in the WoS database of 
publications. However, crucially, this journal is in the database of cited journals, so our results 
include all citations to papers published in this journal. We felt that the inclusion of Studies C 
was essential. We therefore used a supplementary table to incorporate the articles published in 
this journal. 
 
- What counts as a ‘scientific’ journal? 
‘Scientific journals’ are defined here in the sense of the National Science Foundation, covering 
biology, biomedical sciences, chemistry, engineering, earth science, mathematics, medicine, 
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and physics. This classification was used in the regular publication of the Science and 
Engineering Indicators. 
 
Appendix#2: Papers published by philosophers of science in scientific journals with the 
highest ARC in science (≥3) (Table 5) 
Name 
Name of philosopher(s) 
involved Specialty Discipline 
N Cit 
SNG ARC SNG 
(Fine [1982]) Fine General Physics Physics 427 15,81 
(Oreskes and Shrader-Frechette 
[1994]) 
Shrader-Frechette 




Science 1167 10,91 
(Laland et al. [2015]) Sterelny General Biology Biology 97 10,78 
(Pacheco et al. [2009]) 
Skyrms Probability & 
Statistics Mathematics 108 7,71 
(Vogeley et al. [2001]) 
Newen Neurology & 
Neurosurgery Neuroscience 394 7,58 
(Kaptchuk et al. [2010]) 
Miller General & Internal 
Medicine Medicine 206 7,10 
(Churchland and Winkielman [2012]) 
Churchland Neurology & 
Neurosurgery Neuroscience 123 6,15 
(Lenski et al. [2003]) Pennock General Biology Biology 232 6,11 
(Regan et al. [2002]) Colyvan Ecology Biology 313 5,91 
(Peterson et al. [2009]) Dietrich General Biology Biology 129 4,96 
(Skyrms and Pemantle [2000]) 
Skyrms Probability & 
Statistics Mathematics 125 4,63 
(Fine [1982]) Fine General Physics Physics 123 4,56 
(Hull [1980]) Hull Ecology Biology 195 4,53 
(Nahum et al. [2015]) Godfrey-Smith General Zoology Biology 26 4,33 
(Colloca and Miller [2011]) Miller Psychiatry Psychiatry 103 4,29 
(Laland et al. [2011]) Sterelny General Biology Biology 94 4,27 
(Smith et al. [2005]) Smith Genetics & Heredity Biology 229 4,24 
(Pollock [1992]) Pollock Computers Computers 71 4,18 
(He et al. [2014]) Smith Applied Mathematics Mathematics 29 4,14 
(Pitowsky [1991]) Pitowsky Applied Mathematics Mathematics 77 3,85 
(Heywood and Redhead [1983]) Redhead General Physics Physics 96 3,84 
(Hirst et al. [2014]) 
Howick General & Internal 
Medicine Medicine 56 3,73 
(Hull [1979]) Hull General Zoology Biology 67 3,72 
(Winther [2001]) Winther General Zoology Biology 69 3,63 
(Clifton et al. [2003]) 
Clifton 
Bub 
Halvorson General Physics Physics 83 3,61 
(Bernstein et al. [1984]) Byerly General Biology Biology 54 3,60 
(Beatty [1982]) Beatty General Zoology Biology 57 3,35 
(Brigandt and Love [2012]) 
Brigandt 
Love General Zoology Biology 23 3,29 
(Bernstein et al. [1985]) Byerly Genetics & Heredity Biology 134 3,19 
(Hansson [1994]) Hansson General Mathematics Mathematics 38 3,17 
(Malament [1977]) Malament General Physics Physics 76 3,17 
(Samadi and Barberousse [2006]) Barberousse General Zoology Biology 43 3,07 
(Ramsey et al. [2010]) 
Glymour Neurology & 
Neurosurgery Neuroscience 98 3,06 
(Smith [1996]) Smith Computers Computers 60 3,00 
(Fetzer [1988]) Fetzer Computers Computers 54 3,00 
(Fine [1985]) Fine General Mathematics Mathematics 42 3,00 
(Burgansky-Eliash et al. [2005]) Glymour Ophthalmology Medicine 78 3,00 
(Badzia̧g et al. [2009]) Pitowsky General Physics Physics 60 3,00 
 




Appendix#3: How to define and assess a scientific ‘contribution’? 
Contribution is more difficult to characterize and is more subjective than intervention and 
visibility. We therefore started with an operational, if limited, approach to contribution. First, 
contribution is a subset of visibility: no article can be contributive if it has not been cited in a 
scientific journal. Notwithstanding the difference between contribution and visibility, an article 
is more likely to be a scientific contribution if it is cited by articles themselves highly cited in 
this domain. Second, based on (Moravcsik and Murugesan [1975]), we considered a paper to 
constitute a contribution if its citation in scientific papers was qualitatively ‘rich’, that is:  
- Long: the reference to the paper is somewhat developed; 
- Nonredundant: the paper is cited on its own (not together with other papers); 
- Accurate: the citation is not erroneous in terms of the content of the paper; 
- Precise: the citation is not vague, but developed with some detail; 
- Determinate: the citation is not neutral or indifferent, but accepts or rejects a 
claim made by the paper; 
- Operational: the citing paper uses results from the cited paper. 
None of these criteria were considered necessary or sufficient, but the more of these criteria 
satisfied to a significant degree by the paper, the more contributive it is likely to be. Conversely, 
papers not fulfilling these criteria may nevertheless be contributions. In many fields, the usual 
way in which scientific papers are cited does not fulfil these criteria, but they are nevertheless 
contributive. Some papers may be so central and obviously contributive that they are no longer 
even cited. Our strategy here, however, was designed to eliminate false-positive and borderline 
cases, which would overestimate the number of contributions or the degree of contribution.  
 Table 6 shows how we used the above criteria in the articles mentioned in section 5. 
These articles were chosen by crossing information on 1) visibility in science, 2) informal 
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inquiry among specialists in philosophy of science of what the most contributive papers are 
according to them, and 3) most interventionist philosophers. Two of us (T.P. and M.L.) then 
established a preliminary list, independently applied the criteria above to them and kept only 
papers they agreed on, saw to it that the major subfields of PinS were represented, then retrieved 




Citing papers Long Nonredundant Accurate Precise Determinate10 Operational 
Hull (1980) 
(Gould and Lloyd 
[1999]) 








(Ratnieks and Reeve 
[1992]) 








    ±DP  
Malament 
(1977) 
(Surya [2019])       
(García-Parrado and 
Senovilla [2005]) 
      
Clifton et 
al. (2003) 
(Spekkens [2007])       
(Barrett [2007])       
(Oreshkov et al. 
[2012]) 
      
Smith et al. 
(2005) 
(Carbon et al. 
[2019]) 
    DP+  
(de Matos et al. 
[2010]) 
      
(Malone et al. 
[2010]) 




(Kendler et al. 
[2008]) 
    DN  
(Belmaker and 
Agam [2008]) 
    DP  





(Kwong et al. 
[1992]) 
    DP  
(Dale et al. [2000])     DP  
(Belliveau et al. 
[1991]) 




(Valdes-Sosa et al. 
[2011]) 
      
(Sternberg [2011])     DP  
(VanderWeele 
[2009]) 
      
(Kitcher 
[1981]) 
(Frost and Kluge 
[1994]) 
      
(Williams and 
Lombrozo [2010]) 
      
(Brewer et al. 
[1998]) 
      
Table 6. Substantial vs. perfunctory citations by scientists to papers written by philosophers of science 
 
10 “DP”, determinate positive; “DN”, determinate negative. 
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Appendix#4: Examples of papers fulfilling the three-element condition of PinS, by 
category of scientific proposal (Table 7) 
Two of us (T.P. and M.L.)  independently established a preliminary list of 229 papers with ARC 
in science ≥1 by coding the presence of each of the three conditions that define PinS 
independently from the list of philosophical tools mentioned in section 7. They removed articles 
where they could not agree after independent assessment, then discussion, either that a scientific 
problem or solution was provided, or that a specific philosophical tool was used. 136 met these 
criteria according to both reviewers, that is, 59 %.  Cross-checked with the 76 references of 
Table 7 (minus books, and articles by scientists), the total is a list of 163 PinS papers (provided 
on[link]). Though far from being exhaustive, this list confirms that PinS constitutes a trend in 
philosophy of science. 
 
TYPE OF PROPOSAL DETAILED EXAMPLES OTHER EXAMPLES 
Results Experiments - Shimony contributed to the formulation of 
novel experimental programs for testing 
Bell’s theorem (Clauser et al. [1969]; 
Clauser and Shimony [1978]). 
- (Kaptchuk et al. [2010]) is a clinical trial 
showing that the placebo effect can be 
obtained even in patients who were told 
that the substance they were given is not 
active. 
(Kwan et al. [2012]) 
(Wakefield et al. [2007]) 
(Lenski et al. [2003]) 
(Nahum et al. [2015]) 
(Batali and Kitcher [1995]) 
Theories (Clifton et al. [2003]) develops an 
information-based approach to quantum 
theory. 
(Thagard et al. [1990]) 




(Laland et al. [2015]) 
(Bernstein et al. [1985]) 
(Bernstein et al. [1984]) 
(Peterson et al. [2009]) 
(Bouchard [2011]) 
(Pacheco et al. [2009]) 
(Page and Mitchell [1998]) 
Demonstrations (Suppes and Zanotti [1981]) establishes 
two theorems and a corollary on how to 
establish that two-valued variables have a 
common cause, based on Suppes’ 
probabilistic theory of causality.   
(Fine [1982]) 
(Greenberger et al. [1990]) 
(Halvorson [2004]) 
(Badzia̧g et al. [2009]) 
Tools Methodologies - (Cartwright and Munro [2010]) limits the 
area of relevance for randomized clinical 
trials based on the proposed concept of 
‘capacity’. 
(Churchland and Sejnowski 
[1988]) 
(Howick et al. [2009]) 
(Parnas et al. [2005]) 
 41 
- Based on what a justification is, (Kollner 
[2009]) determines which axioms are 
justified in limiting the undecidability of 
some statements in set theories. 
- (Griffiths et al. [2015]) proposes a method 
to quantitatively measure causal specificity 
in different biological contexts, including 
DNA coding. 
(Parkkinen et al. [2018]) 
(Smith et al. [2005]) 
(He et al. [2014]) 
Conceptual tools - (Ladyman et al. [2013]) reviews features 
widely associated with complex systems 
(nonlinearity, feedback, etc.), demonstrates 
that some are neither necessary nor 
sufficient, while others must be excluded 
because of their vagueness; it also proposes 
its own list of necessary conditions and 
show how those could foster future work. 
- Shimony ([1995]) offers not only a 
conceptual analysis of entanglement in 
quantum mechanics, but also an approach 
for quantifying the degree of entanglement.  
- (Godfrey-Smith [2015]) provides a novel 
analysis of the concept of reproduction in 
evolutionary biology (by distinguishing 
three types of reproduction: “simple”, 
“collective”, “scaffolded”), shedding light 
on highly diverse of biological examples. 
- (Bernat et al. [1981]) distinguishes 
between a definition and a criterion of 
death, establish that total and irreversible 
loss of functioning of the whole brain 
should be the criterion of death and give the 
corresponding definition of death. 
(Wakefield [1992]) 
(Cleland and Chyba [2002]) 
(Ruiz-Mirazo et al. [2004]) 
(Brigandt [2003]) 
(Brigandt and Love [2012]) 
(Hull [1978]) 
(Hull [1980]) 
(Gould and Lloyd [1999]) 
(Winther [2001]) 
(Regan et al. [2002]) 
(Samadi and Barberousse 
[2006]) 




Debates  - (Sarkar [2000]) and (Griffiths [2001]) 
critique the then influential view among 
biologists  that genes contain 
“information” (e.g., (Maynard Smith 
[2000])). 
- (Beatty [1982]) shows that pattern 
cladistics, largely inspired by a naïve 
“Popperian” philosophy of science, is at 
odds with evolutionary thinking and 
creates many conceptual confusions. 
- (Vandenbroucke et al. [2016]) phrases 
the presuppositions of the dominant 
“restricted potential outcome approach” to 
causality and highlight its shortcomings. 
(Worrall [2002]) 




(Gilbert et al. [2012]) 
(Gilbert and Sarkar [2000]) 
(Mameli and Bateson [2006]) 
(Bapteste et al. [2009]) 
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